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 How Diff erent Kinds of Disagreement 
Impact Folk Metaethical Judgments 
 James R.  Beebe * 
 Although the empirical study of folk metaethical judgments is still in its infancy, 
a variety of interesting and signifi cant results have been obtained. 1 Goodwin 
and Darley (2008), for example, report that individuals tend to regard ethical 
statements as more objective than conventional or taste claims and almost 
as objective as scientifi c claims, although there is considerable variation in 
metaethical intuitions across individuals and across diff erent ethical issues. 
Goodwin and Darley (2012) also report (i) that participants treat statements 
condemning ethical wrongdoing as more objective than statements enjoining 
good or morally exemplary actions, (ii) that perceived consensus regarding an 
ethical statement positively infl uences ratings of metaethical objectivity, and 
(iii) that moral objectivism is associated with greater discomfort with and more 
pejorative attributions toward those with whom individuals disagreed. Beebe 
and Sackris (under review) found that folk metaethical commitments vary 
across diff erent life stages, with decreased objectivism during the college years. 
 Sarkissian et al. (2011) found that folk intuitions about metaethical objectivity 
vary as a function of cultural distance, with increased cultural distance between 
disagreeing parties leading to decreased attributions of metaethical objectivity. 
Wright et al. (forthcoming) found that not only is there signifi cant diversity 
among individuals with regard to the objectivity they attribute to ethical claims, 
there is also signifi cant diversity of opinion with respect to whether individuals 
take certain issues such as abortion or anonymously donating money to charity 
to be ethical issues at all, despite the fact that philosophers overwhelmingly 
regard these issues as ethical. 2 Wright et al. (forthcoming) provide the following 
useful summary of the current set of fi ndings on folk metaethical intuitions: 
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 People do not appear to conceive of morality as a unifi ed (meta-ethically 
speaking) domain, but rather as a domain whose normative mandates 
come in diff erent shapes and sizes. Th ey view the wrongness of some moral 
actions as clear and unquestionable, unaltered (and unalterable) by the 
feelings/beliefs/values of the individual or culture. Th ey view the wrongness 
of other actions (though still genuinely moral in nature) as more sensitive 
to, and molded by, the feelings/beliefs/values of the actor and/or the people 
whose lives would be (or have been) aff ected by the action. Th is possibility is 
one we ’ ve not seen seriously considered in the meta-ethical literature — and 
perhaps it is time that it was. 
 Th e present article reports a series of experiments designed to extend 
the empirical investigation of folk metaethical intuitions by examining how 
diff erent kinds of ethical disagreement can impact attributions of objectivity 
to ethical claims. 
 Study 1 reports a replication of Beebe and Sackris ’ work on metaethical 
intuitions, in order to establish a baseline of comparison for Studies 2 through 4. 
In Study 2, societal disagreement about ethical issues was made salient to 
participants before they answered metaethical questions about the objectivity 
of ethical claims, and this was found to decrease attributions of objectivity 
to those claims. In Studies 3 and 4, the parties with whom participants were 
asked to consider having an ethical disagreement were made more concrete 
than in Studies 1 and 2, using either verbal descriptions or facial pictures. Th is 
manipulation was found to increase attributions of metaethical objectivity. In a 
fi nal study, metaethical judgments were shown to vary with the moral valence 
of the actions performed by the disagreeing party — in other words, a Knobe 
eff ect for metaethical judgments was found. Th ese studies aim to increase our 
understanding of the complexity of the folk metaethical landscape. 
 Study 1 
 Method 
 Participants 
 Study 1 was an attempt to replicate Beebe and Sackris ’ (under review) initial 
study with a population of participants that was limited to the same university 
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student population from which participants for Studies 2 and 3 would be 
drawn. Participants were 192 undergraduate students (average age   20, 53% 
female, 40% Anglo-American) from the University at Buff alo (a large, public 
university in the northeastern United States) in exchange for extra credit in an 
introductory course. 
 Materials 
 Beebe and Sackris asked two and a half thousand participants between the 
ages 12 and 88 to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with 
the claims that appear in Table 9.1 and the extent to which they thought that 
 “ people in our society ” disagreed about whether they are true. Th e same set of 
claims was used in Studies 1 through 3. 
 Procedure 
 Th e items from Table 9.1 were divided into three questionnaire versions, and 
participants indicated their agreement or disagreement with them on a six-point 
scale, where  “ 1 ” was anchored with  “ Strongly Disagree ” and  “ 6 ” with  “ Strongly 
Agree. ” Participants rated the extent to which they thought people in our society 
disagreed about the various claims on a six-point scale anchored with  “ Th ere is no 
disagreement at all ” and  “ Th ere is an extremely large amount of disagreement. ” 
 In order to capture one kind of objectivity that participants might attribute to 
the various claims in Table 9.1, participants were asked,  “ If someone disagrees 
with you about whether [one of these claims is true], is it possible for both of 
you to be correct or must one of you be mistaken? ” Th e answer  “ At least one of 
you must be mistaken ” was interpreted as an attribution of objectivity, and an 
answer of  “ It is possible for both of you to be correct ” was taken to be a denial 
of objectivity. 
 Results 
 As can be seen from Figure 9.1, the items in Table 9.1 are ordered within each 
subcategory in terms of increasing proportions of participants who attributed 
objectivity to them. 
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Table 9.1 Factual, ethical, and taste claims used in Beebe and Sackris (under review) 
and in Studies 1 through 4
Factual
 1. Frequent exercise usually helps people to lose weight.
 2.  Global warming is due primarily to human activity (for example, the burning 
of fossil fuels).
 3. Humans evolved from more primitive primate species.
 4. Th ere is an even number of stars in the universe.
 5. Julius Caesar did not drink wine on his 21st birthday.
 6. New York City is further north than Los Angeles.
 7. Th e earth is only 6,000 years old.
 8. Mars is the smallest planet in the solar system.
Ethical
 9.  Assisting in the death of a friend who has a disease for which there is no known 
cure and who is in terrible pain and wants to die is morally permissible.
10.  Before the third month of pregnancy, abortion for any reason is morally 
permissible.
11.  Anonymously donating a signifi cant portion of one’s income to charity is 
morally good.
12. Scientifi c research on human embryonic stem cells is morally wrong.
13. Lying on behalf of a friend who is accused of murder is morally permissible.
14.  Cutting the American fl ag into pieces and using it to clean one’s bathroom 
is morally wrong.
15.  Cheating on an exam that you have to pass in order to graduate is morally 
permissible.
16. Hitting someone just because you feel like it is wrong.
17. Robbing a bank in order to pay for an expensive vacation is morally bad.
18. Treating someone poorly on the basis of their race is morally wrong.
Taste
19. Classical music is better than rock music.
20. Brad Pitt is better looking than Drew Carey.
21. McDonald’s hamburgers taste better than hamburgers made at home.
22.  Gourmet meals from fancy Italian restaurants taste better than microwavable 
frozen dinners.
23. Barack Obama is a better public speaker than George W. Bush.
24. Beethoven was a better musician than Britney Spears is.
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 Goodwin and Darley (2008) and Beebe and Sackris both found that more 
participants attributed objectivity to factual claims than to ethical or taste 
claims. In Study 1, a greater proportion of participants attributed objectivity 
to factual claims (0.64, averaged across all claims in the factual subcategory) 
than to ethical (0.34) or taste (0.10) claims. Chi-square tests of independence 
reveal that the diff erence between the factual and ethical proportions was 
signifi cant, c 2 (1,  N   926)   80.523,  p   0.001, Cram é r ’ s V   0.30, and the 
diff erence between the ethical and taste proportions was signifi cant as well, 
c 2 (1,  N   826)   61.483,  p   0.001, Cram é r ’ s V   0.27. 3 Study 1 also replicates 
earlier fi ndings that objectivity attributions are positively associated with 
strength of belief about an issue (c 2 (2,  N   1,224)   67.276,  p   0.001, 
Cram é r ’ s V   0.23) but negatively associated with the extent of perceived 
disagreement about the issue (c 2 (5,  N   1,218)   89.517,  p   0.001, Cram é r ’ s 
V   0.27). In other words, participants tended to attribute more objectivity to 
claims that they had stronger opinions about than to claims they had weaker 
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Figure 9.1 Proportions of participants who attributed objectivity to the 24 items in 
Study 1. Error bars in all fi gures represent 95 percent confi dence intervals.
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opinions about, but they tended to attribute less objectivity to claims they 
recognized were widely disputed in society. Somewhat surprisingly, higher 
ratings of perceived disagreement about an issue were positively associated with 
participants ’ strength of opinion about the issue, c 2 (10,  N   1,212)   100.897, 
 p   0.001, Cram é r ’ s V   0.20. 
 Discussion 
 Like Goodwin and Darley (2008) and Beebe and Sackris, Study 1 found that 
participants attribute more objectivity to some ethical claims than to some 
factual claims and that there is signifi cant variation concerning the degree of 
objectivity attributed to diff erent claims within each subcategory. 4 Th us, Study 
1 reinforces the conclusion already established by Goodwin and Darley (2008) 
and Beebe and Sackris that the question of whether ordinary individuals are 
moral objectivists is not going to have a simple  “ Yes ” or  “ No ” answer. 
 Study 2 
 Method 
 Participants 
 A total of 195 undergraduate students (average age   19, 47% female, 69% 
Anglo-American) from the University at Buff alo participated in Study 2 in 
exchange for extra credit in an introductory course. 
 Materials and procedure 
 Th e primary purpose of Study 1 was to construct a baseline of data with which 
the results of Studies 2 through 4 could be compared. Th ese latter studies 
each introduce some kind of modifi cation to the research materials used 
in Study 1 in order to see how folk metaethical judgments will be aff ected. 
Th e manipulation in Study 2 was simply a change in the order of the tasks 
participants were asked to complete. 
 As noted above, Study 1 followed Beebe and Sackris in having participants 
perform the following tasks in the following order: 
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 Task 1: Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
with a given claim. 
 Task 2: Participants answered the question  “ If someone disagrees with you 
about whether [the claim in question is true], is it possible for both of you 
to be correct or must at least one of you be mistaken?. ” 
 Task 3: Participants rated the extent to which they thought people in our 
society disagreed about whether the claim in question is true. 
 Th us, the last thing participants were asked to do was to consider about the 
extent of societal disagreement with respect to the claims. Given the negative 
association between perceived disagreement and objectivity attributions, it 
was hypothesized that if participants were directed to think about societal 
disagreement before completing Task 2, their attributions of metaethical 
objectivity would decrease. Disagreement was not hypothesized to have a 
similar eff ect on factual and taste claims. 
 Results 
 As expected, the overall proportion of objectivity attributions in the ethical 
subcategory was lower in Study 2 (0.29) than in Study 1 (0.34). Th is diff erence 
was signifi cant, c 2 (1,  N   1045)   4.015,  p   0.05, Cram é r ’ s V   0.06. Th ere 
were no signifi cant diff erences in the factual and taste subcategories. Th us, it 
appears that making disagreement about ethical issues salient to participants 
can have a modest eff ect on the metaethical judgments they make. Th e fact that 
this result was obtained in the ethical domain but not in the factual domain 
is consistent with the widespread view among philosophers that ethical 
disagreement — because of its seemingly intractability — poses a signifi cant 
challenge to the objectivity of ethical claims in a way that disagreement about 
factual matters fails to do for the objectivity of factual claims. 5 
 Discussion 
 Th e fi ndings of Study 2 are consistent not only with the correlational data 
obtained by Goodwin and Darley (2008) and Beebe and Sackris but also with 
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the experimental data obtained by Goodwin and Darley (2012). Th e latter 
manipulated participants ’ perceived consensus about ethical issues by giving 
them bogus information about the percentage of students from the same 
institution who agreed with them. Participants who were told that a majority 
of their peers agreed with them about some ethical statement were more likely 
to think there was a correct answer as to whether or not the statement was true 
than participants who were told that signifi cantly fewer of their peers agreed 
with them. Th ese studies show that perceived disagreement or consensus can 
be a causal and not a merely correlational factor in folk metaethical decision-
making. 
 Study 3 
 Various studies of folk intuitions about moral responsibility have shown that 
individuals hold agents more responsible for their actions when the situations of 
those agents are described concretely than when they are described abstractly. 
Nichols and Knobe (2007), for example, obtained signifi cantly higher ratings 
of moral responsibility for  “ Bill, ” who was attracted to his secretary and killed 
his wife and three children in order to be with her, than for  “ a person ” whose 
actions were left  unspecifi ed. Small and Loewenstein (2003, 2005) showed that 
the subtlest change in the concreteness of the representation of an individual 
can lead to surprising diff erences in judgments or decisions regarding them. 
When their participants were given the opportunity to punish randomly 
selected defectors in an economic game, participants selected signifi cantly 
harsher punishments for anonymous defectors whose numbers had just 
been chosen than for anonymous defectors whose numbers were about to be 
chosen. Because increased concreteness appears to heighten or intensify the 
engagement of cognitive and aff ective processes associated with attributions 
of blame and responsibility and to lead participants to treat the actions of 
concrete individuals as more serious than abstractly represented ones, 6 it was 
hypothesized that increasing the concreteness of those with whom participants 
were asked to imagine they disagreed would lead participants to take the 
disagreements more seriously and to increase attributions of metaethical 
objectivity. 
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 Method 
 Participants 
 A total of 108 undergraduate students (average age   19, 59% female, 66% 
Anglo-American) from the University at Buff alo participated in Study 3 in 
exchange for extra credit in an introductory course. 
 Materials and procedure 
 In Beebe and Sackris ’ materials, which serve as the basis for Studies 1 and 2, 
each participant was asked  “ If someone disagrees with you about whether [one 
of these claims is true], is it possible for both of you to be correct or must 
one of you be mistaken?. ” In Study 3, this unspecifi ed  “ someone ” was replaced 
with  “ Joelle P., a junior nursing major at UB, ”  “ Mike G., a freshman computer 
science major at UB, ” or some other student from the participant ’ s university, 
whose fi rst name, last initial, class, and major were specifi ed. 
 In between completing Tasks 1 and 3 (which were described above) for 
8 of the 24 claims found in Table 9.1, each participant completed a modifi ed 
version of Task 2 such as the following: 
 Madeline B., a senior biology major at UB, believes it is permissible to 
lie on behalf of a friend who is accused of murder. If you disagree with 
Madeline B., is it possible for both of you to be correct or must one of you 
be mistaken? 
   It is possible for both of you to be correct. 
   At least one of you must be mistaken. 
 [If you agree with Madeline B., please skip to the next question.] 
 Results 
 In accord with my expectations, having more concrete parties with which to 
disagree resulted in a signifi cantly greater overall proportion of objectivity 
attributions to ethical claims in Study 3 (0.43) than in Study 1 (0.34), c 2 (1, 
 N   826)   5.399,  p   0.05, Cram é r ’ s V   0.08. Th e proportions were 
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numerically higher for eight of the ten ethical claims. Having more concrete 
parties in Study 3 did not, however, result in any signifi cant diff erence in the 
objectivity attributed to factual or taste claims. 
 Discussion 
 Th e results from Study 3 are consisted with those obtained by Sarkissian 
et al. (2011), who found that strong objectivity ratings were obtained when 
participants were asked to consider disagreeing with a concretely presented 
individual from their same culture (vs. a concretely presented individual 
from a diff erent culture). Th e fact that the concreteness of the disagreeing 
parties used in Study 3 led to increased metaethical objectivity attributions 
may also explain why the objectivity ratings obtained in Study 1 fell below 
those obtained by Goodwin and Darley (2008), even though both used 
samples of university students. Th e Task 2 objectivity question in Study 1 
asked participants to consider a situation of hypothetical disagreement 
( “ If someone disagrees with you . . . ” ). Goodwin and Darley (2008, 1344), 
however, instructed participants,  “ We have done prior psychological testing 
with these statements, and we have a body of data concerning them. None 
of the statements have produced 100% agreement or disagreement. ” Each 
of Goodwin and Darley ’ s objectivity questions then reiterated that some 
individuals who had been previously tested disagreed with participants 
about the relevant issue. Goodwin and Darley thus constructed situations of 
disagreement that were more concrete than those in Studies 1 and 2 by having 
(allegedly) actual rather than merely hypothetical individuals who disagreed 
with participants. 
 Study 4 
 Study 3 made the parties with whom experimental participants were asked to 
consider disagreeing concrete by providing them with given names, surname 
initials, academic classes, and majors. In Study 4, the disagreeing parties 
were made concrete by having pictures of their faces shown. Faces (and parts 
of faces) have been shown to have a variety of eff ects on morally relevant 
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behavior. For example, Bateson et al. (2006) found that academics paid 276 
percent more for the tea they took from a departmental tea station when an 
image of eyes was displayed by the station than when an image of fl owers 
was displayed. Rezlescu, Duchaine, Olivola, and Chater (2012) found that 
unfakeable facial features associated with trustworthiness attracted 42 percent 
greater investment in an economic game that required trust. 7 
 Method 
 Participants 
 A total of 360 participants (average age   32, 38% female, 82% Anglo-
American) were recruited through Amazon ’ s Mechanical Turk (www.
mturk.com) and were directed to complete online questionnaires hosted at 
vovici.com. 8 
 Materials and procedure 
 Combining behavioral studies and computer modeling, Oosterhof and 
Todorov (2008) found that individuals make surprisingly consistent judgments 
about socially relevant traits of individuals on the basis of diff erences 
in their facial characteristics. Th ey claim that the two most important 
dimensions of face evaluation are trustworthiness/untrustworthiness and 
dominance/submissiveness. Judgments concerning the fi rst dimension are 
reliably associated with judgments about whether an individual should be 
approached or avoided and with attributions of happiness or anger. Judgments 
concerning dominance or submissiveness were found to be reliably associated 
with judgments of the maturity, masculinity, and physical strength of an 
individual. Both untrustworthy and dominant faces were associated with 
potential threat. 9 By exaggerating features specifi c to one of these evaluative 
dimensions, Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) created the set of faces represented 
in Table 9.2. 10 Each of the non-neutral faces was plus or minus three standard 
deviations from the mean along the relevant dimension. Th e faces in Table 9.2 
were used in Study 4, along with a control condition in which no face was 
displayed. 
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 Claims (12), (13), and (14) from Table 9.1 — concerning embryonic stem 
cell research, lying for a friend accused of murder, and treating a national fl ag 
disrespectfully — were selected for use in Study 4. Th e degrees of objectivity 
attributed to them in Studies 1 through 3 fell in the middle range, suggesting 
that judgments about them could be more easily manipulated than judgments 
near the fl oor or ceiling. Th e fi rst screen contained one of the pictures from 
Table 9.2, along with the following (Task 1) question: 
Table 9.2 Faces used in Study 4
Dominant
Trustworthy Neutral Untrustworthy
Submissive
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 Mark (pictured above 11 ) believes that [statement (12), (13), or (14) is true]. 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with Mark ’ s belief. 
   Agree 
   Disagree 
 If participants selected  “ Agree ” in response to one Task 1 question, they 
would be directed to answer the Task 1 question for one of the other target 
claims. However, if participants selected  “ Disagree, ” they were directed to 
answer the following (Task 2) metaethical question about their disagreement 
before moving on to the next Task 1 question: 
 You disagree with Mark about whether [the target claim is true]. Is it possible 
for both of you to be correct about this issue or must at least one of you be 
mistaken? 
   It is possible for both of you to be correct. 
   At least one of you must be mistaken. 
 Each screen that presented the metaethical question included the same 
picture (if any) that participants saw at the top of their Task 1 question. Each 
participant was presented with claims (12), (13), and (14) in counterbalanced 
order. Th e same picture (if any) of Mark appeared above each of these questions. 
Th us, no participant saw more than one version of Mark ’ s face. 
 It was hypothesized that the fi ve facial conditions would engage online 
processes of social cognition to a greater degree than the control condition 
and that this would result in higher attributions of metaethical objectivity. 
On the basis of Oosterhof and Todorov ’ s (2008) fi nding that untrustworthy 
and dominant faces were associated with potential threat, it was also 
hypothesized that untrustworthy and dominant faces would elicit lower 
objectivity attributions than their dimensional pairs, since participants might 
be more tentative or anxious about disagreeing with potentially threatening 
interlocutors. 
 Results 
 Th e proportion of objective attributions was signifi cantly higher in the 
Neutral (0.65), Dominant (0.61), Submissive (0.60), Trustworthy (0.67), 
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and Untrustworthy (0.66) face conditions than it was in the No Face (0.46) 
condition. Th e proportions of objectivity attributions in the fi ve face conditions 
did not diff er signifi cantly from each other. 
 Discussion 
 Th us, it appears that having a face — any face, perhaps — makes the situation 
of moral judgment more concrete and engages moral cognitive processes in a 
way that increases attributions of objectivity. Because there were no signifi cant 
diff erences between the Trustworthy and Untrustworthy conditions and the 
Dominant and Submissive face conditions, the second hypothesis concerning 
the eff ect of specifi c kinds of faces on folk metaethical intuitions failed to 
receive confi rmation from Study 4. 12 
 Study 5 
 Method 
 Participants 
 Using a between-subjects design, 160 participants (average age   34, 38% 
female, 80% Anglo-American) were recruited through Amazon ’ s Mechanical 
Turk and were directed to complete online questionnaires hosted at vovici.
com. 13 
 Materials and procedure 
 A fi nal study was constructed to see if the moral valence of the actions that 
disagreeing parties were described as performing would have an eff ect on 
folk metaethical judgments. Building upon work on the well-known Knobe 
eff ect in experimental philosophy, 14 in which individuals ’ folk psychological 
attributions have been shown to depend in surprising ways upon the 
goodness or badness of agents ’ actions, the following four descriptions were 
constructed: 
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1.  Th e CEO of a company that helps and preserves the environment believes 
that it is morally wrong to harm the environment. 
2.  Th e CEO of a company that helps and preserves the environment believes 
that it is not morally wrong to harm the environment. 
3.  Th e CEO of a company that harms and pollutes the environment believes 
that it is morally wrong to harm the environment. 
4.  Th e CEO of a company that harms and pollutes the environment believes 
that it is not morally wrong to harm the environment. 
 In (1) and (2), the CEO is depicted doing something morally good, namely, 
helping and preserving the environment, whereas the CEO ’ s actions in (3) and 
(4) are morally bad. In (1) and (3), the CEO is described as having a morally 
good belief about the environment, namely, that it should not be harmed; in 
(2) and (4), the CEO has the corresponding morally bad belief. Th e crossing of 
good and bad actions with good and bad beliefs results in the actions and beliefs 
of the CEO being congruent in (1) and (4) and incongruent in (2) and (3). 
 Participants were fi rst asked to indicate in a forced-choice format whether 
they agreed or disagreed with the CEO ’ s belief. Th ey were then asked,  “ If 
someone disagreed with the CEO about whether it is morally wrong to harm 
the environment, would it be possible for both of them to be correct or must 
at least one of them be mistaken?. ” Participants were then directed to choose 
between  “ It is possible for both of them to be correct ” and  “ At least one of them 
must be mistaken. ” 
 Results 
 Th e results of Study 5 are summarized in Figure 9.2. 
 Participants were more inclined to attribute objectivity to the ethical 
beliefs in question when the protagonist performed morally bad actions 
than when he performed morally good ones. Th is diff erence was signifi cant, 
c 2 (1,  N   160)   5.013,  p   0.05, Cram é r ’ s V   0.18. Neither belief valence 
nor the congruence between action and belief signifi cantly aff ected folk 
metaethical judgments. However, it is noteworthy that the highest proportion 
of objectivity attributions was obtained in the  “ double bad ” (i.e., Bad Action/
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Bad Belief) condition, since it is badness (rather than goodness or neutrality) 
that has been shown to be the driving force behind the various forms of the 
Knobe eff ect. 
 Discussion 
 As with other fi ndings from the Knobe eff ect literature, the moral valence of 
a protagonist ’ s action signifi cantly aff ected participants ’ responses to probe 
questions. However, unlike other results in this literature, the responses in 
question were not folk psychological ascriptions. Th ey were second-order 
attributions of objectivity to ethical beliefs held by the protagonist. Th ese 
results provide further evidence that individuals ’ assessments of metaethical 
disagreements are signifi cantly aff ected by a variety of factors in the situation 
of disagreement. 
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Figure 9.2 Mean objectivity attributions in the Good Action/Good Belief (0.55), 
Good Action/Bad Belief (0.43), Bad Action/Good Belief (0.57), and Bad Action/Bad 
Belief (0.75) conditions of Study 5.
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 General discussion 
 Th e foregoing studies show (i) that making disagreement salient to participants 
before asking them to make metaethical judgments can decrease objectivist 
responses, (ii) that increasing the concreteness of the situation of disagreement 
participants are directed to consider can increase objectivist responses, and 
(iii) that the moral valence of the actions performed by agents whose ethical 
beliefs participants are asked to consider aff ected attributions of objectivity 
to those beliefs. Because philosophical discussion — whether in the classroom 
or at professional conferences — oft en takes place in a somewhat rarefi ed 
atmosphere of abstractions, philosophers should be aware that intuitive 
agreement or disagreement with their metaethical claims can be aff ected by 
the very abstractness of those situations and that the amount of agreement or 
disagreement they encounter might be diff erent in other situations. In spite of the 
fact that an increasing number of philosophers are familiar with the Knobe eff ect 
and its seemingly unlimited range of applicability, many philosophers continue 
to give little thought either to the moral valence of the actions depicted in their 
favored thought experiments and/or to the consequences this might have. 
 An important question raised by the studies reported above concerns the 
coherence of folk metaethical commitments. Most philosophers assume that 
the correct semantics for ordinary ethical judgments must show them to be 
uniformly objective or subjective. 15 Yet, Studies 2 through 5 — in addition to 
work by Goodwin and Darley (2008), Beebe and Sackris (under review), and 
Sarkissian et al. (2011) — reveal that there are several kinds of variation in folk 
metaethical judgments. Th e lack of uniformity in the objectivity attributed 
to ethical claims might make us wonder how well ordinary individuals grasp 
the ideas of objectivism and subjectivism (and perhaps the related ideas of 
relativism and universalism). It might also lead us to question their reasoning 
abilities. Goodwin and Darley (2008, 1358, 1359), for example, suggest that 
 “ individuals were not particularly consistent in their meta-ethical positions 
about various ethical beliefs ” and that  “ requirements of judgmental consistency 
across ethical scenarios are not considered. ” However, this attribution of 
inconsistency seems both uncharitable and unwarranted. 
 Why should we believe that the ordinary use of ethical terms requires 
a semantics that assumes uniform objectivity or subjectivity? Because 
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armchair philosophers who have gathered no empirical evidence about the 
actual practice of using ethical terms say so? It seems that the practice should 
dictate the semantics, and not the other way around. If we fi nd variability 
in the practice, we should look for semantic theories that can accommodate 
such variation. Furthermore, a variety of semantic theories can do so. For 
example, in Beebe (2010) I off er a relevant alternatives account of ethical 
judgments that borrows heavily from the semantic machinery of the 
epistemic contextualists (e.g., Lewis 1996; DeRose 2011). I argue that treating 
ethical terms as context-sensitive yields a better interpretation of ordinary 
normative and metaethical judgments than interpretations that treat them 
as context-invariant. Without delving into the details of the view, the upshot 
for present purposes is that attributions of inconsistency or incoherence 
to folk metaethical practice are premature when there are more charitable 
interpretive options available. 
 Another important issue raised by the above studies concerns my hypothesis 
that it is concreteness that is driving the eff ects observed in Studies 3 and 4. 
An alternative possibility is that when undergraduates at the University at 
Buff alo are told that Madeline B., a senior biology major at UB, believes that 
some action is morally permissible, it may be Madeline ’ s cultural proximity or 
group affi  liation that leads participants to make more objectivist judgments. 
Signaling that someone from the same university believes that  p may suggest 
to participants that they should believe it as well, if they are to remain members 
in good standing in the relevant group. And it is of course possible that some 
other kind of social infl uence might be operative as well. Further research is 
required to determine whether it is concreteness or other social factors that 
push individuals in the direction of greater objectivism. 16 
 Th e studies reported above show that not only are there diff erences in folk 
metaethical judgments that track the content of ethical claims (Goodwin and 
Darley 2008; Beebe and Sackris, under review; Study 1), how contested they 
are (Goodwin and Darley 2012; Study 2), and the cultural distance between 
disagreeing parties (Sarkissian et al. 2011); there are also diff erences that track 
the goodness or badness of disagreeing parties (Study 5) and possibly their 
concreteness as well (Studies 3 and 4). It is hoped that the present research 
sheds useful light on the multi-dimensional variation that characterizes the 
folk metaethical landscape. 
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a previous version of this manuscript. Correspondence should be addressed to 
James R. Beebe, 135 Park Hall, Department of Philosophy, University at Buff alo, 
Buff alo, NY 14260. Email: jbeebe2@buff alo.edu. 
  1  However, cf. Beebe and Sackris (under review, sec. 1) for critical discussion of 
many of the measures of metaethical commitments that are employed in the 
published literature. 
  2  Forty-one percent of participants in one study and 38 percent of participants 
in another classifi ed fi rst trimester abortion as a personal rather than a moral 
issue; 89 percent and 73 percent of participants did the same for anonymously 
donating money to charity. 
  3  All statistical tests reported in this chapter are chi-square tests of independence. 
On the conventional interpretation of Cram é r ’ s V, an eff ect size of 0.1 to 0.29 
counts as small, one 0.3 to 0.49 counts as medium, and one 0.5 or larger counts 
as large. 
  4  Th e only gender diff erences in the data were that females held slightly less strong 
opinions than males on factual matters (c 2 (2,  N   303)   6.124,  p   0.05, Cram é r ’ s 
V   0.14) and reported greater societal disagreement than males concerning 
matters of taste (c 2 (2,  N   225)   11.296,  p   0.05, Cram é r ’ s V   0.22). 
  5  Cf. Sidgwick (1907/1981, 342), Mackie (1977, 36 – 8), Wong (1984), and Tersman 
(2006). Because salient disagreement impacted participants ’ second-order 
(metaethical) judgments in Study 2, a follow-up study was performed to see if 
salient disagreement might have a similar impact upon participants ’ fi rst-order 
judgments — that is, upon the degree of agreement they expressed in response to 
various ethical claims in Task 1. Participants were directed to complete Task 3 
immediately before Task 1, and it was hypothesized that salient disagreement 
would result in less confi dent Task 1 judgments. However, this manipulation 
failed to have a signifi cant impact on participants ’ Task 1 judgments. 
  6  Nahmias et al. (2007) found that this was especially true if wrongdoing is involved. 
  7  Th anks to Mark Alfano for bringing this work to my attention. 
  8  Participants were required to reside in the United States and to have at least a 
95 percent approval rating on more than 500 mturk tasks. Each participant was 
paid  $ .30. 
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  9  Untrustworthy faces were associated with potentially harmful intentions, while 
dominant faces were associated with the capacity to cause harm. 
  10  Oosterhof and Todorov constructed the faces using FaceGen Modeller 3.2 
(Singular Inversions 2007). 
  11  Th is phrase of course did not appear in the No Face condition. 
  12  It may be that how people respond to these kinds of faces depends upon 
whether they themselves are dominant, submissive, etc. Th e method of the 
present study did not allow this factor to be explored. Th anks to Hagop 
Sarkissian for raising this point. 
  13  Participants were required to reside in the United States and to have at least a 
95 percent approval rating on more than 500 mturk tasks. Each participant was 
paid  $ .30. 
  14  See Alfano et al. (2012) for an overview of this literature. 
  15  See Sinnott-Armstrong (2009) for further discussion of this point. 
  16  Th anks to Hagop Sarkissian and Jen Cole Wright for pressing these points. 
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